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1
Both intellectually and institutionally, the life sciences oc-
cupy a fascinating middle ground between the physical and exact sciences, 
on the one hand, and the social sciences and humanities on the other. If 
biology  were an animal, it would be a duck- billed platypus— something that 
appears chimeric, yet is fully rooted in its own historical lineage of accumu-
lating adaptations, tinkering, and change.
Like that strange aquatic mammal, “half bird, half beast,”1 its features 
point to its origins and ecol ogy. Biology as a science has come into being 
as a patchwork, assuming its present visage as a consequence of myriad 
interactions between diff erent traditions of knowledge, method, and phi-
losophy while maintaining an overarching quest for understanding of the 
natural world. Indeed, historically, many researchers have come from out-
side biology to ask fundamentally biological questions. These outsiders have 
played a crucial and defi ning role in the growth of modern biology; they 
have brought new skills and ideas to the “inside” and have thus added 
something new to biology. As a consequence, biology can feel sometimes as 
if it is a strange hybrid— with a bill, a fl at tail, fur, and webbed feet. Aft er all, 
biologists include among their number men and women who sit before com-
puters crunching numbers, as well as cavers who crawl through subterra-
nean spaces in search of lizards; and biology counts among its tools patch- 
clamps and test tubes and microchip arrays and bird- snares. Its worldviews 
range from reductionism to dualism, idealism to emergence. It can oft en 
seem confusing: is biology really just one thing? Like that “highly interest-
ing novelty,” as the beguiling Australian bird- and- reptile- like mammal was 
once called, it is indeed one thing. And like the platypus, biology has been 
formed by adapting forces coming from outside, from the environment of 
other disciplines and practices. The platypus may seem like a paradox, be-
cause it appears to be chimeric. Biology likewise appears chimeric, but has 
attained an internal integrity and innovative potential from those external 
forces.
The molecular revolution of the late twentieth century, for example, was 
to a large degree stimulated by the infl ux of physicists into biology, applying 
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as they did both a diff erent style and approach to the problem of heredity. 
Ecol ogy and population biology, too, have been determinatively shaped by 
the arrival of mathematicians to these fi elds, using tools from their own 
discipline to resolve biological problems with unfamiliar instruments. Lin-
guists have applied their training and tools to investigate problems in cog-
nition, social scientists to attack the puzzles of animal behavior, phi los o phers 
to probe conceptual foundations, writers to sharpen their pens on evolution, 
computer scientists and engineers to try to crack the mystery of life. As such, 
these “outsiders” have supplied important sources of innovation in biology 
and, each in his or her way, contributed to its patchwork design. What is of 
interest to us  here is the manner in which scientists recruited from diff er-
ent disciplines have helped, and continue to help, produce novel approaches, 
concepts, theories, experiments, practices, insights, and— ultimately—novel 
scientifi c understanding.
This book seeks to provide historical descriptions and analyses for the 
ways in which researchers from the “outside” have been sources of signifi -
cant innovation. The collection of cases assembled  here critically examines 
these sources of innovation by considering how diff erent researchers  were 
able to integrate ideas, techniques, and methods across divergent scientifi c 
communities. As will become apparent, these innovations  were NOT idio-
syncratic accidents, but the result of the careful work of making intellec-
tual connections, translating idioms, creating languages, and fostering new 
forms of collaboration that bridged training and experience in the biologi-
cal sciences with a rich array of fi elds, disciplines, and perspectives. In the 
end, outsider interventions have given biology its peculiar form.
the problem of innovation
As early as 1667, Thomas Sprat, historian of the Royal Society of London, 
noted a connection between being an outsider to a trade and inventiveness. 
A glance from an angle, Sprat argued, might well reveal a new aspect of na-
ture. More recently, sociologists Joseph Ben- David and Robert Merton have 
shown the importance of disciplinary immigrants for the development of 
a par tic u lar science.2 Merton, though, problematized a strict dichotomy or 
divide between those considered insiders and outsiders. As a result, later 
thinking about disciplinary boundaries refl ected a more dynamic perspec-
tive regarding disciplinary identity. Lynn Nyhart’s discussion of the birth of 
the discipline of physiology from the older anatomy in nineteenth- century 
German universities, on the other hand, considered the role played by dif-
ferent institutions in erecting boundaries between old and incipient fi elds.3 
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In a broader, more theoretical manner, Peter Galison has applied the an-
thropological notion of the “trading zone” to scientifi c practice, analyzing a 
number of examples from physics in which scientists of diff erent subfi elds 
have met— creating common pidgin idioms, and then creoles— in order to 
jointly attack conundrums.4
But if the “outsider” and the “outsider as innovator” have been recog-
nized as important categories in the history of science more generally, the 
treatment of the “outsider” in the history of biology has been focused more 
narrowly on specifi c instances. A number of histories of the molecular revo-
lution, for example, highlight the role of physicists, such as Max Delbrück 
and Francis Crick, who became biologists and played a foundational role 
in the creation of molecular biology.5 Evelyn Fox Keller, in her book Making 
Sense of Life, features some of the cyberneticists and artifi cial lifers who used 
meta phors from the world of computing to help probe deep problems 
in development and embryology.6 A comparative treatment of the range of 
“outsiders” that have shaped the course of biology more broadly is sorely 
missing. Bringing together a diverse set of examples allows us to explore the 
various conditions that fostered both their movement into biology and their 
innovative contributions to biological understanding.
what makes an “outsider”?
In Outsider Scientists we conceive of outsiders in terms of academic disci-
plines. We are interested in scholars trained or practicing in a nonbiologi-
cal discipline who moved into some branch of biology. These disciplinary 
newcomers or outsiders bring with them perspectives, skill, and training 
that are oft en not shared by insiders— those trained within biology. The fun-
damental question we are considering asks how moving from a fi eld out-
side of biology to a fi eld within biology has served as a signifi cant source 
of scientifi c innovation.7 We have asked our authors to consider what fea-
tures of their subjects’ original scientifi c training and research experience 
in a nonbiological context allowed them to make innovative contributions 
to the fi eld of biology that they eventually joined. But a word of caution: we 
do not wish to hang too much on the category of discipline, because we do 
not think that the question of training and innovation depends strictly on 
moving from one discipline to another, nor do we believe that disciplines, 
as such, are hard and fi xed categories. Rather we are interested in consider-
ing movement between communities of scientists with divergent practices, 
paradigms, or habitus and the role that this intellectual movement plays in 
innovation within biology.
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Movement between communities occurs not just between disciplines 
but also within them. Increasingly, recognized subdisciplines have devel-
oped almost insurmountable barriers, as specializations divide the land-
scape and render movement more diffi  cult within. This is true for biology as 
much if not more than for physics, chemistry, and computing. For that rea-
son, we also consider a number of examples in which researchers from one 
subdiscipline within biology crossed into a second subdiscipline to make 
contributions there. An exemplary case would be Ilya Metchnikoff  moving 
from developmental biology to immunology, or Francois Jacob, moving from 
work on bacteria to mice. Such cases are similar to those of nonbiologists 
crossing into biology because  here too, researchers bring with them com-
pletely new skills, perspectives and training. These par tic u lar outsiders we 
term “insider- outsiders.”
Our defi nition of the outsider, then, is restricted. Excluded from it are 
outsiders on account of religion, ethnicity, gender, and character— though 
for all of these, to be sure, fascinating examples abound. The sole and guid-
ing principle for Outsider Scientists is that the individual in question should 
have moved from one intellectual community, with its distinctive practices 
and established conceptions, into an area of biology new to that individual. 
Because these migrating scholars oft en bring with them tools, techniques, 
theories, and practices, we could have chosen to follow these instrumentali-
ties into new areas, but we chose instead to follow individuals into new com-
munities and institutions. The biographical focus of each of the following 
chapters is not intended to portray scientists as lone knowers, but as mem-
bers of new disciplinary communities— members who signifi cantly alter the 
practices of those communities.
Making judgments as to who is an outsider and who isn’t, however, 
necessarily remains a complicated aff air. To begin with, one needs to as-
sume that there is an “inside” outsiders must enter, and this was not always 
true in biology. Lamarck may have coined the term in 1802, but biology as a 
coherent fi eld and well- defi ned community, with institutions and academic 
programs, par tic u lar subdisciplines, research agenda, and journals, took 
time to establish, and of course remains in fl ux. When does one mark the 
inception of a fi eld: When its name is coined? When the fi rst society of 
practitioners is founded? When the subject is included as a fi eld of study in 
the universities? However one approaches this problem, it is clear that the 
trajectory and growth of biology was unique in diff erent historical contexts, 
such as in the German-, French-, and English- speaking worlds.8
Wary of the slipperiness— and to a degree the arbitrariness— of defi ning 
a hard and fast historical date for the birth of biology as a discipline, we 
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have chosen to include in this volume a fi rst section that will treat a num-
ber of early examples of interesting nineteenth- century practitioners whose 
engagement with problems of a living nature illustrates the very diffi  culty 
involved in speaking about “outsiders” with any confi dence before the late 
nineteenth century. Gregor Mendel was a clergyman who had little or no 
formal training in anything called “biology.” The worlds that he uniquely 
united— experimental physics gleaned at the University of Vienna, the 
middle- European business of practical plant and animal breeding, and 
the local scientifi c society at Brünn— gave birth to a research program that 
would play a crucial role in the establishment of ge ne tics and the establish-
ment of biology as an identifi able fi eld years later. Mendel helps us under-
stand, both intellectually and in terms of earlier local traditions, what the 
creation of an “inside” for modern biology entails. Similarly, the role of Pas-
teur the businessman and chemist, moving into what was rapidly becoming 
an institutional biologie in France, helps put a fi nger on the pro cess of the 
birth of the disciplinary divides that defi ned a distinct biology, as does Felix 
d’Herelle’s uniquely self- taught (and fascinatingly international) trajectory 
in microbiology. Finally, to round off  the early examples, the contributions 
of Samuel Butler, the Victorian novelist, serve to trigger a discussion of the 
ways in which literary engagement with the idea of evolution challenged a 
number of crucial divides: the science- philosophy divide via the teleology 
and causality debate, and the public- private divide via the debate concerning 
the proper forum for negotiating scientifi c disputes. These four individuals 
play an important role in allowing us more carefully to consider the criteria 
for “inside” and “outside” in biology as they developed historically.
Thus, the fi rst part of the book, “Outsiders before the Inside,” treats 
the dichotomies of teleology– effi  cient causality, amateur- professional, local- 
international, industry- academia, and public- private, each of which played 
a role in the birth of modern biology. Other examples could have served us 
 here, but we have chosen these early individuals in order to create a mean-
ingful set of contrasting cases to later fi gures who  were involved in the 
creation of innovations following explicit acts of boundary crossing into 
areas of modern biology.
Recognizing “outsiders” in biology becomes more straightforward as we 
consider the development of the biological sciences in the twentieth cen-
tury, and it is this century that is the main focus of Outsider Scientists. 
 Here the challenge of understanding outsiders and their innovations in 
biology pertains less to the ambiguity of describing an “inside” or an “out-
side,” and more to a problem of selecting a range of both diverse and rep-
resentative outsiders. There have been many practitioners in biology who 
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can be thought of as “outsiders,” and we have had to think long and hard 
about whom to include. We would have liked to include more than eventu-
ally made it in— there are, in other words, outsiders who “got away.” One 
thinks in par tic u lar of Max Delbrück, Herbert Simon, Isaac Asimov, Gerald 
Edelman, Seymour Benzer and, reaching further back, Goethe as an early 
“outsider before the inside,” who as an artist and morphologist attempted 
to reconcile his divergent pursuits. It is our hope that this par tic u lar collec-
tion will spur others to examine such fi gures in the mode we suggest. The 
fi gures that have made it into our book have been chosen to illustrate the 
myriad ways in which “outsider science” comes about and functions. For 
each case we have chosen expert contributors, each with a broad and deep 
knowledge of the relevant history and context.
Before we continue any further, we’d like to address a quick word to 
the skeptic. The category of the “outsider” in science, the objection might 
run, is too diff use to be of any value. Aft er all, there are many ways to be an 
“outsider,” and the dynamic of insider- outsider interactions will necessarily 
take many forms. Our reply to the skeptic is meant to disarm: we agree. Our 
goal is not to defi ne exhaustively what it has meant to be an “outsider” to 
biology. Given the shift ing nature of biology as a discipline, that would be 
a Herculean task. But we do not shy away from this diversity. Very much to 
the contrary, we are consciously setting out to present it in as full a fashion 
as possible rather than unthinkingly “lumping” all the disparate histories 
into a conceptual straitjacket. Clearly, the contingencies matter, as do the 
myriad facets of the outsider incursions— that is the point of the historical 
narratives that follow. Our goal is to off er a range of historical cases that 
allow us to comparatively understand the elements of discipline crossing 
that contribute to pro cesses of scientifi c innovation.
Our analysis does assume that “discipline” is a legitimate historical cat-
egory. While most scholars would agree that biology is and has been a 
discipline, they can diff er on what exactly constitutes a discipline.9 Special-
ization and institutionalization through markers such as professional soci-
eties, journals, and designated funding streams have typically been recog-
nized as elements of discipline formation. More recently, epistemic criteria of 
problem defi nition and practice have been added. Minding and maintaining 
the boundaries of scientifi c disciplines has also been the object of scholarly re-
search, especially as biology itself has emerged as a dynamic enterprise. While 
contemporary biology, especially since the rise of the molecular revolution, is 
widely recognized as a mosaic or hybrid of many diverse subfi elds, in the early 
twentieth century there was a distinct movement to seek a unifi ed biology. 
Historians, such as Betty Smocovitis, have written eloquently about the de-
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sire to articulate a common core to the discipline of biology and about the 
challenges to this unifi cation. While consensus on a unifying theory, even 
within the so- called evolutionary synthesis, proved elusive, scientifi c societ-
ies  were formed, journals established, and the social and cultural defi nition 
of biology was perpetuated, even if it was always in motion. The fl uidity 
of the disciplining of biology does make it a moving target for historians. 
However, we do not need an entity  etched in stone. We need an entity that is 
suffi  ciently diff erent from neighboring areas of inquiry that we can say that 
chemistry as a discipline, for instance, diff ers from biology as a discipline in 
terms of imparting to its members distinctive concepts, theories, methods, 
practices, and approaches. The various sub- branches of biology will diff er 
among themselves, but the general pattern of the  whole will yet distinguish 
it from other major areas of inquiry, such as chemistry.
Discipline crossing draws our critical attention to forms of epistemic 
diff erence that may be rooted in the style of thought an outsider brings with 
her, a par tic u lar set of intellectual tools, an experimental apparatus or de-
sign, or that may involve more broadly (and deeply) a general vision or specifi c 
motivation.10 Discipline crossing may relate to the way that the reception of 
outsiders is determined by so cio log i cal as opposed to intellectual reasons, 
and how this varies depending on the par tic u lar “outside” one is coming 
from. The salient objective is that the cast of “outsiders” illustrate, as a group, 
a wide spectrum of the diff erent facets of the phenomena.
the outsiders who made it in
To help the reader, and in order to provide an or ga niz ing framework, we 
have divided the book into six parts. They are 1) Outsiders before the Inside, 
2) Outsiders from the Physical Sciences, 3) Outsiders from Mathematics, 
4) Outsiders from the Human Sciences, 5) Insider- Outsiders, and 6) Outsid-
ers from Informatics.
As we have mentioned, the category “Outsiders before the Inside” in-
cludes accounts of Mendel, Pasteur, d’Herelle, and Butler. The histories of 
these fi gures will introduce a perspective on innovation through the integra-
tion of diverse interests, approaches, and practices before there was a clearly 
demarcated discipline identifi ed as biology. Importantly, they provide a 
contrast to the stories of the later periods in which disciplinary markers are 
more easily discerned, since those markers  were more actively enforced af-
ter the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, many of the dichotomies these 
early examples highlight— such as teleology vs. effi  cient causality, amateur vs. 
professional, industry vs. academia— provided the defi nitional distinctions 
that later biologists used to create and enforce disciplinary boundaries. All 
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four cases, authored by Sander Gliboff , Jonathan Simon, William Summers, 
and Michael Ruse, respectively, speak to the power of movement across the 
intellectual terrain as a means to foster new insights.
In part 2, essays by Sahotra Sarkar, Gregory Morgan, and Hallam Stevens 
introduce us to a sample of the many physicists who crossed into biology in 
the twentieth century. Erwin Schrödinger and Linus Pauling may be famil-
iar subjects, but Sarkar and Morgan provide careful new consideration of 
how these two Nobel laureates translated their knowledge of physics into 
biological idiom, and in so doing helped create the foundations of molecu-
lar biology. Stevens describes the work of Walter Goad, a less well- known 
fi gure, who used his understanding of computational physics acquired in 
atomic bomb work to reshape the ge ne tic databases and algorithms that 
now form the basis of bioinformatics.
In our third part, Michael Dietrich and Robert Skipper Jr., Maya Shmailov, 
and Jay Odenbough each consider scientists at the interface of mathemat-
ics and biology. R. A. Fisher, Nicolas Rashevsky, and Robert MacArthur all 
brought mathematical and statistical insights to bear on biological phenom-
ena in ways that transformed biological practice from its earlier naturalist 
tradition. The statistical tools developed by Fisher alone have become com-
pletely commonplace in all branches of biology as a result.
Part 4 considers outsiders from the human sciences, with essays by 
W. Tecumseh Fitch on the linguist Noam Chomsky, T. J. Horder on the phi-
los o pher David Hull, and Erika Lorraine Milam on the writer Elaine Morgan. 
These cases do not represent equally infl uential incursions into biology: 
Chomsky’s attempt to pry open the brain by exploring the rules of grammar 
helped bring about a revolution in the cognitive sciences, while Hull’s and 
Morgan’s grappling with par tic u lar theories of systematics and evolution, 
respectively, produced more of a glancing blow toward their discipline of 
evolutionary biology. Still, taken together, the three examples illustrate 
salient features of biology’s intersection with the humanities.
In part 5 we meet two “insider- outsiders”: Ilya Metchnikoff  and François 
Jacob. In their essays on these internal migrants, Fred Tauber and Michel 
Morange show how movement across subfi eld boundaries can be both dif-
fi cult and transformative. Drawing from his background in embryology and 
development, Metchnikoff  challenged the prevailing theories of immunity 
of his day, while Jacob took principles he had learned working on bacteria 
and phage in molecular biology and applied them to the mouse in the study 
of disease.
The fi nal section of the book deals with the infl uence of informati-
cians on the life sciences. Chapters by Ehud Lamm on John von Neumann 
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and Norbert Weiner, Oren Harman on George Price, and Luis Campos on 
Drew Endy reveal how biological systems have been reimagined in some-
times radical ways by outsiders redesigning their new disciplinary homes 
using the theoretical frameworks and idioms of computer science and 
informatics.
what have we learned from our outsiders?
The essays that follow shed light on three elements of the relationship that is 
our focus: the outsider, the pro cess of coming in to biology, and the pro cess 
of innovation. Concentrating on these three elements allows us to explore 
the roles of features of personalities, institutions, and prior training that 
have shaped the wide range of scientifi c novelties described in the chapters. 
We start with the outsider.
On the Outsider
The outsiders described  here are not your typical scientists. When it comes 
to “outsiderness” as an aspect of character, many of these individuals reveal 
traits that rendered their crossing of boundaries almost natural. They are 
bona fi de transgressors. They see little point in respecting conventional 
boundaries, either because they view them as inherently ridiculous or be-
cause they don’t see them at all. A quintessential example is George Price. 
He was nothing if not an intellectual scavenger. Trained in nuclear chemistry, 
he switched from the Manhattan Project to work at Bell Labs on transistors 
and informatics, then to cancer research at a Minnesota hospital, then to 
magazine writing on current aff airs, then to computer problems at IBM, 
then fi nally to mathematical evolution, all the while sending unsolicited let-
ters to Nobel laureates that claimed breakthroughs in fi elds as disparate as 
neurophysiology and economics. Price saw problems, not disciplines, and, 
fueled by a cocksure attitude and dismissiveness toward convention— for 
better and for worse— acted accordingly. Linus Pauling shared with Price a 
similar disposition. Fiercely in de pen dent of mind, Pauling used the occa-
sion of his 1954 chemistry Nobel lecture to admonish young scientists never 
to take anything on authority and always to think for themselves, respect-
ing no boundaries; eight years later, he was in Stockholm again receiving a 
second Nobel Prize, this time for Peace. Erwin Schrödinger, too, possessed 
an aspect of character that made him a natural outsider: the confi dence of a 
man who thought— together with Einstein, it must be admitted, but against 
the better judgment of the rest of the physics community— that the apparent 
paradoxes of quantum mechanics would eventually disappear. It was this 
confi dence, no doubt, that helped to stoke his pretension to explain heredity 
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by means of quantum mechanics when he attempted an answer to the ques-
tion “What is life?” in a series of lectures delivered in 1943.
“Cocksure,” “arrogant,” “confi dent”— these are appellations we fi nd ap-
plied again and again to our outsiders, and not by insiders alone. Nicolas 
Rashevky stormed into the life sciences from mathematics seeking to shake 
its very core (“You name it, he had a theory on it,” one commentator quipped); 
“hot- tempered” Ilya Metchnikoff  humiliated Nobel laureates in a fi eld he had 
never studied but wished to transform; Drew Endy, hyperconfi dent and extol-
ling a culture of “cool,” sought to revolutionize biology by using engineer-
ing principles to synthesize life itself. The diminutive Elaine Morgan, Erika 
Milam tells us, “had sass,” marshaling wit and humor to take her male- 
chauvinist targets to task. Earlier in the century, Felix d’Herelle, marshaled 
the autodidact’s bold self- possession to revolutionize microbiology, and R. A. 
Fisher, like a terrier hound (which he incidentally resembled), showed incor-
rigible per sis tence against opponents in applying statistics to evolution and 
heredity. Of course, outsiders’ personalities  were nevertheless by no means 
static.
Oft en outsiders possessed a broad “vision” which they actively pursued: 
Rashevsky and Fisher and MacArthur sought to mathematize biology and 
Pauling sought to bring physical chemistry to biology, for example. Fisher 
believed that this kind of intervention from the outside was most diffi  cult 
for insiders to accept: “A new subject for investigation,” Dietrich and Skip-
per quote him as saying, “will fi nd itself opposed by indiff erence, by inertia, 
and usually by ridicule. A new point of view, however, aff ecting thought on 
a wide range of topics may expect a much fi ercer antagonism.” Sometimes, 
as with Price, there is no more than a kind of problem- specifi c intellectual 
opportunism. Sometimes, as with Endy, perhaps both are present.
But incursions from the outside are not always the result of a par tic u lar 
aspect of personality; sometimes they simply describe the act of crossing an 
unseen, or alternatively a closely patrolled, divide to solve a par tic u lar prob-
lem. Our “Outsiders before the Inside” are examples of the former. Each, in his 
own way, moved from one métier to another without necessarily exercising 
the muscles of overbearing confi dence, or expressing hatred of authority, or 
indulging in contempt for convention (think of the gentle curate, Mendel)— 
though Butler probably imagined himself a Re nais sance man. Louis Pasteur, 
to the medical establishment, might have been insuff erable, but microbiol-
ogy, at any rate, had yet to defi ne its boundaries. Walter Goad, by contrast, is 
a modern example of a man who didn’t possess the fi ery “outsider” charac-
ter, but nevertheless recognized a void, entering the fi eld, with the help of a 
long- standing institutional interest at Los Alamos in biology and medicine, 
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to apply numerical data management tools to ge ne tic databasing. It was his 
tool— the computer— rather than his temperament that led Goad into biol-
ogy, allowing him to import ready- made ways of thinking, doing, and or ga-
niz ing with little re sis tance.
Regardless of personality, the outsider’s training was always of the ut-
most importance. Perhaps we should not be surprised to fi nd that no small 
fraction of our outsiders actually had a prior connection to biology before 
trying to enter the fi eld. Drew Endy may have received a D in high school 
biology for failing to recite the Latin names of 200 insects, but Robert 
MacArthur, whose dad was a ge ne ticist, actually got his PhD in ecol ogy. 
Norbert Weiner, too, studied biology before becoming a mathematician, 
showing par tic u lar interest in physiology and teleology. Fisher, from the 
outset, had been hooked by eugenics and biometry, alongside mathematics, 
and Schrödinger, though most people don’t know this, was an international 
authority on the physiology and biophysics of color vision. Still, it is the 
prior training in the nonbiological discipline that we are most interested 
in, since the training usually lays the foundation for the incursion to begin 
with. We’ll address this par tic u lar issue when we turn to innovation, but 
fi rst let’s take a look at the pro cess of the outsider moving in.
On Moving In
The pro cess of crossing a divide entails a number of elements that we fi nd 
recurring in one form or another in many of the outsiders considered  here. 
These are the role of patrons and forward- looking funding bodies; the role 
of institutions; collaboration both with insiders and fellow outsiders; court-
ing; and— closer to the content of innovation itself— processes of translation, 
simplifi cation (especially with theoreticians), and sometimes popularization 
(especially with outsiders from the humanities). Each of these features rep-
resents an aspect of institutions and the social context that supported the 
outsider seeking to bring an original result, method, or perspective to the 
life sciences.
To begin with, a patron, it would seem, is a wonderful thing to have for 
an outsider. A number of our outsiders manifestly benefi ted from having 
enthusiastic supporters, though others neither sought nor  were off ered 
assistance. Perhaps the starkest example of patronage  here is that of Major 
Leonard Darwin, Charles Darwin’s fourth son and an avid eugenicist, who, 
from quite early on, decided that he was going to do everything he could 
to help advance R. A. Fisher’s career. This meant helping him publish his 
famous 1918 paper on the correlation of relatives on the supposition of Men-
delian inheritance. The paper played a historical role in wedding Mendelian 
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ge ne tics to Darwinian selection. It was, however, initially rejected by Fish-
er’s great nemesis, Karl Pearson, for publication in his journal Biometrika. 
Thanks to Leonard Darwin’s intervention, the paper was published in the 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Moreover, Darwin arranged to 
have Fisher supported by monthly stipends, enabling him to develop his syn-
thesizing insights, which culminated in what became his magnum opus, 
The Ge ne tical Theory of Natural Selection, in 1930. George Price, too, enjoyed 
patronage from John Maynard Smith and Bill Hamilton, collaborators both; 
but their aid went beyond the usual bounds. It was Hamilton, aft er all, who 
by way of a ruse cajoled the editor of Nature into publishing Price’s path-
breaking covariance paper, which no doubt otherwise would not have seen 
the light of day. Similarly, without the generosity and encouragement of John 
Maynard Smith, their historic joint paper, which applied game theory to 
animal confl ict, would most probably have never been written.
Felix d’Herelle provides perhaps the starkest counterexample, a man 
who made it decidedly on his own. Having left  school at seventeen, and work-
ing from the periphery, d’Herelle was neither a member nor even known to 
either the Koch or Pasteur school of microbiology, at least for quite some 
time. Relying on his own reason and confi dence, and all the while moving 
from place to place (Canada to Guatemala to Mexico to Argentina to Colum-
bia to Algeria to Tunisia to Cyprus to France, and more), he never enjoyed 
any form of patronage, except for a short- term commission tendered by the 
Argentine Minister of Agriculture to exterminate locusts in his country. 
D’Herelle was a lone maverick.
Individual patrons may not be necessary, but some form of support or 
ac cep tance is oft en crucial, such as forward- looking funding bodies. Warren 
Weaver of the Rocke fel ler Foundation is a celebrated example of a supportive 
administrator, one who had the foresight to off er critical aid to both Pauling 
and Rashevsky at Cal Tech and at the University of Chicago, respectively.11 In 
both cases, Weaver saw what many who  were unequivocally insiders didn’t 
notice, that outside tools— structural chemistry and mathematics, in these 
cases— could go a long way to help solve important “insider” problems. 
Drew Endy, on the other hand, at least when he began, was rather impeded 
by the main funding taps: one agency threw his grant request out the win-
dow citing irrelevance, and worse, complete lack of believability.
Indeed, outsiders don’t always fi nd institutional homes that are willing to 
take a chance on projects that seem to many unimportant or even sinister. 
Pauling, however good a chemist he was known to be, ended up creating 
his own institute, the Institute of Orthomolecular Medicine, later renamed 
the Linus Pauling Institute of Science and Medicine. He used the institute 
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to pursue his vitamin C research, which does indicate that buying a home 
for “free thinking”  doesn’t always lead to the best results. Rashevsky, too, 
found the going rather rough at the University of Chicago, Weaver’s support 
notwithstanding. Moving (or rather being moved) from the Department of 
Psychology to the Department of Physiology and back again, he found his 
work continually falling between the cracks. He was too mathematical for the 
biologists and too biological for the physicists and mathematicians. Finally, 
he solved the problem by creating his own Journal of Mathematical Biophys-
ics, which had more success than the Institute of Orthomolecular Medicine.
Outsider incursions always occur within some institutional context. Some 
outsiders  were fortunate to fi nd the “right” institution, one that provided 
support for newcomers, encouraged collaboration, and sought interdisci-
plinary connections to address biological problems. Fisher, for example, was 
free at the Rothamsted Experimental Station to pursue both practical and 
theoretical work integrating statistics, biology, and eugenics that might 
very well have been impossible elsewhere (including Cambridge). Price, too, 
years later, enjoyed the backing of a kind institution: when he walked off  the 
street into the University College London biostatistics department with his 
covariance equation written on a piece of paper— the ultimate outsider act if 
ever there was one— he was aff orded an honorary research position within 
the hour and summarily helped to secure a grant for further research; Uni-
versity College London, mind you, was a world- leading center of ge ne tics at 
the time. Goad’s career, too, makes the point of institutional importance. 
Indeed, Los Alamos’s war time successes rendered it continually crucial to 
national security, which meant greater latitude for se nior scientists in fol-
lowing curiosity- driven research. As Hallam Stevens shows, the “exigencies of 
war time work” also promoted interdisciplinary collaboration. This meant 
for Goad that he could play a leading role in convincing the National Insti-
tutes of Health to fund the GenBank project. Institutional backing, then, 
seems to be a relative quantity when it comes to outsiders. Some, like Fisher, 
Price, and Goad,  were lucky to be spurred on and provided the means by 
their institutions; others, like Rashevsky and Pauling, fought within until 
they found external solutions; still others, like Butler, d’Herelle, and Morgan, 
didn’t even try.
But if institutional support has a variable infl uence, collaborations, almost 
across the board, seem crucial. Pauling (with Alfred Mirsky, Karl Landsteiner, 
and then Emile Zuckerkandl), Price (with John Maynard Smith and Bill 
Hamilton), and Weiner (with Arturo Rosenblueth) all prove how important 
work with bona fi de insiders possessing complementary (rather than identi-
cal) skills can be. None of these outsiders would have been able to get very far 
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without their collaborators. Their work on protein stabilization by hydrogen 
bonds, antibody specifi city, evolutionary molecular clocks, the evolution-
ary stable strategy, multilevel selection, and negative feedback, respectively, 
would have been the worse for it. Pauling explained the cooperative dynamic 
nicely: “Landsteiner would ask, ‘What do these experimental observations 
force us to believe about the world?’ and I would ask, ‘What is the most 
simple, general, and intellectually satisfying picture of the world that encom-
passes these observations and is not incompatible with them?’ ” The collabo-
rators’ methodological departures and diff erences in perspective, as well as 
their help in the more mundane technicalities— such as learning correct no-
tations and suitable experimental designs— proved crucial to these outsiders 
for solving important problems. In some cases, as in Price’s, affi  xing one’s 
name beside that of a well- known insider also made a great diff erence.
Outsiders turn to fellow outsiders for collaborations as much as they do 
to insiders. Pauling, for instance, worked with the biochemist Robert Corey 
on determining structures of amino acids and on models of protein chains; 
Corey was as much an outsider in his way to biochemistry as Pauling was to 
molecular biology. Weiner joined hands with an electrical engineer collabo-
rator, Julian Bigelow, to work together with the insider Rosenblueth. Goad 
worked with the physical chemist John Camm; together they examined 
transport pro cesses in biological systems on IBM 704 and 7094 machines. 
Francois Jacob sent his own bacteria and phage men, Hubert Condamine 
and Charles Babinet, to study mammalian embryology and to return to his 
lab; Jacob himself declined to learn from the insiders directly. Schrödinger 
may have wanted to shake up biologists, but it was the physicists— Seymour 
Benzer, Crick, George Gamow, Salvador Luria— who heeded his call more 
than anyone  else. But Endy is perhaps the ultimate example of an outsider 
who knew he would need to turn to like- minded outsiders to get anywhere at 
all: he extended his hand to Tom Knight and his fellow electrical engineers 
at MIT rather than engage true insiders in biology. When he found himself at 
a disciplinary crossroads— should he study more molecular biology from 
the inside or think as an outsider engineer?— Endy determined to “screw 
it,” since the complications and details of biology seemed “of little interest.”
Courting the inside is sometimes a requisite for outsiders, even if look-
ing at Endy’s path  doesn’t immediately divulge this. The biological world 
into which both Weiner and von Neumann  were attempting to enter, for 
example, was anything but hospitable. Ehud Lamm quotes E. B. Wilson, at 
the 1934 Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology, off ering a 
number of axioms to the initiated, the fi rst of which was “science need not 
be mathematical,” and the second, “simply because a subject is mathemati-
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cal it need not therefore be scientifi c.” The inside, clearly, was less than in-
viting. Incidentally, Weiner and von Neumann ended up choosing diff erent 
approaches to engaging biologists— the former seeking out collaboration, 
the latter going it alone.
The writers Samuel Butler and Elaine Morgan, too, understood full well 
that they needed to court their readership— whether by gripping drama, 
scathing wit, gentle humor, or all of these— and directed their talents inward 
as much as out. Still, popularization was an issue: the way to succeed, both 
authors knew, entailed capturing the hearts and minds of the public. As 
Michael Ruse explains, when it came to evolution, before 1859 the subject 
was considered a pseudoscience, aft er 1930 it was professionalized, and in be-
tween its status was ambiguous (though it may be objected that early fi gures 
as central as George Cuvier and Karl Ernst von Baer took evolution seriously 
enough to go to great lengths to dispute it, and that evolution was taught 
in many German universities by 1860, and even before).12 Focusing on the 
English- speaking world, Ruse argues that evolution was a pop u lar science 
during this period, and the pop u lar book or novel as legitimate and infl u-
ential a venue as the scientifi c paper. Insiders like T. H. Huxley and George 
Romanes grasped this, which is why they themselves attempted to speak to 
the public alongside their more professional writings, understanding full 
well, if reluctantly, that this meant the door had been pushed wide open. But-
ler capitalized, building a successful career as a pop u lar writer on evolution. 
Aft er him, Morgan did too, though in her day she was required to mount a 
tighter argument, based on a careful reading of the scientifi c evidence. And 
while Noam Chomsky may have awaited his Steven Pinker, he has neverthe-
less used the tele vi sion to great eff ect in making himself known as a public 
intellectual, as much for his linguistic theories as for his politics.
On Innovation
Outsiders bring with them new language as well as designs. In order to 
express their innovative ideas, then, they must engage in a pro cess of trans-
lation.13 Schrödinger, for example, transported terminology such as “iso-
mers” from organic chemistry to describe diff erent stable states of genes, 
and “tunneling” from physics to speak of the pro cess of translation between 
such states to help explain, among other things, mutations. “Negative en-
tropy” was another concept he used to translate a concept from thermo-
dynamics into one in molecular biology, a translation that may well have 
given birth to more confusion than clarity.
Price, too, as Harman shows, went about the business of translating con-
cepts, in his case from Claude Shannon’s channel capacity informatics to 
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selection dynamics more broadly. It was the precision and beauty of the 
formalization of the theory of communication that Price sought to translate 
into biology. Von Neumann and Weiner  were very much engaged in a kind of 
translation enterprise as well, using “self- reproducing automata” and “nega-
tive feedback” as central concepts otherwise unheard of within biology. 
And Endy fashioned repressible promoters as transistors, the biological 
and ge ne tic equivalents to toggle switches and oscillators.
Translating, or rather getting insiders to understand translations, isn’t 
always easy, as the correspondence between Joshua Lederberg and Jon von 
Neumann attests. Lederberg wanted to know how intracellular components 
correspond to the elements of the cellular automata model, but von Neu-
mann’s conceptual model had no relation to biological realities. Lionel Pen-
rose, too, found it diffi  cult to fi nd answers to specifi c biological questions 
in von Neumann’s model, in par tic u lar those having to do with the physical 
and chemical aspects of self- reproduction. For both biologists, the engage-
ment with the mathematician proved frustrating.
Indeed, biology is a messy science, full of details and exceptions. It is for this 
reason that many of the outsiders coming in— in par tic u lar, theoreticians and 
those with mathematical and physical skills— sought to simplify matters in 
order, as it  were, to see the forest in de pen dently of the trees. Rashevsky, to 
be sure, wanted to transform biology into a deductive science rather than an 
empirically based one, where theory based on oversimplifi ed— oft en grossly 
oversimplifi ed— scenarios (of cell division, growth, nerve conduction, brain 
function,  etc.) could be used to predict trends rather than exact values, and 
help direct avenues of research. In looking at island biogeography, spe-
cies abundance distribution, and optimal foraging strategies, MacArthur 
preferred “patterns” to trends. Indeed, science itself was to him essentially 
a matter of detecting patterns, an approach that allowed him to transform 
ecol ogy from a descriptive science to a structured and predictive one. But 
integrating ge ne tics, ecol ogy, biogeography, and ethology was no small or-
der, and by necessity it called for simplifying. Indeed, the members of the 
Marlboro Circle to which he belonged— Egbert Leigh, E. O. Wilson, Richard 
Levins, and Richard Lewontin— all agreed that only two of any three goals— 
generality, realism, and precision— could ever be maximized, and MacArthur 
preferred the fi rst two. They called it the “simple theory” approach. “Our 
truth is the intersection of in de pen dent lies,” was how Levins put it, with 
commendable honesty.
Price, too, sought to simplify by generalizing. His tautological covariance 
equation had exactly zero biological assumptions in it, which is precisely why 
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it was diffi  cult for many biologists to appreciate its import (many still don’t). 
Endy’s synthetic biology, almost by defi nition, was a science of standardiza-
tion, hence simplifi cation. And von Neumann, looking at self- reproduction, 
was interested in the internal functional or ga ni za tion of the system, an 
exercise accomplished by axiomatizing the behavior of the system’s com-
ponents. This again was an idealization, and hence a simplifi cation, rather 
than an attempt to describe real biological phenomena.
Simplifi cations off ered by outsiders invariably ruffl  e the feathers of in-
siders to the point of fury. Theodosius Dobzhansky was being gentle when 
he intoned, as Lamm quotes him: “Experience has shown that, at least in bi-
ology, generalization and integration can best be made by scientists who are 
also fact- gatherers, rather than by specialists in biological speculation.” The 
future Nobel laureate neurophysiologist John Eccles was harsher, letting the 
community know that he thought his own fi eld would be strictly impeded, 
rather than advanced, by superfi cial analogies to automata. And Endy’s 
detractors so resisted the idealization behind his “Standard Parts List for 
Biological Circuitry” that Endy invited disgruntled biologists to send com-
plaints to the “Offi  ce of Biological Disenchantment, MIT 68- 580” (in other 
words, his offi  ce in the electrical engineering department). Still, despite its 
detractors, simplifi cation has been a real motor for innovation.
At the base of the ability to simplify, generalize, and translate stands the 
par tic u lar training and intellectual territory from whence the outsider ar-
rives. Take for example Pauling’s background in crystallography, which so-
lidifi ed his unshakeable belief in the idea that properties of all substances 
depend on their structure. It was this “methodological structural reduction-
ism,” as Gregory Morgan calls it, that pushed him to seek the explanation of 
cellular behavior at a “deeper” level, leading to the solution of the alpha he-
lix, among other problems. Take Weiner’s work on target- tracking machines 
for the American Air Force during World War II: it was  here that he fi rst 
encountered the oscillatory movement for which he found an analogue in 
the intention tremors of human ce re bral patients, and which, via the wed-
ding of feedback to intentionality, became the conceptual centerpiece of 
the science of cybernetics. Or take Price’s work at Bell Labs with Shockley 
and Bardeen, which familiarized him with Claude Shannon’s theory of com-
munication, a theory he then sought to apply to the pro cess of biological 
selection. Or Goad’s earlier work in physics on the hydrogen bomb, which, 
Hallam Stevens claims, is responsible for the introduction of computers 
into mainstream biology. Goad recognized that the kind of numerical and 
statistical methods he had used to solve data- intensive problems in fi ssion 
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and fusion could be applied, using digital electronic computers, to ge ne tics. 
GenBank, the database he created, was premised on the notion that biologi-
cal problems could be framed as pattern- matching and data- management 
problems. Ultimately, the system of sharing, communication, or ga niz ing, and 
distributing DNA sequence data that it produced allowed for the birth of 
the Human Genome Project. In all these cases, there is a direct connection, 
even a direct analogy, between prior work in one fi eld and the later work in 
biology.
Endy, too, in calling for an “open source biology” based on “tools of mass 
construction,” deployed an analogy between Boolean electrical gates that 
can perform simple operation such as AND, OR, NOT, NAND, NOR and 
ge ne tic components that could be construed as “BioBricks.” In so doing, he 
swept away with one blow the model organism approach, since, to his mind 
at least, standardized biological parts rendered such lab- based practices un-
necessary. As Luis Campos argues, this was the ultimate outsider biology— 
outside of the confi nes of even the organism itself or the species— but it was 
based on a functional analogy and a confi dent assurance of its validity. Pas-
teur, too, saw an analogy between fermentation and infectious diseases, as 
Jonathan Simon elucidates. This vision drew a direct line for him between 
his chemical work, on the one hand, and his medical- biological work on the 
other. The Frenchman’s eye for the utility of organisms oriented micro-
biology fi rst to industrial production and then to the treatment of disease, 
two directions that would be enhanced by d’Herelle’s international work in 
the twentieth century.
Analogy is not the only route for the introduction of a divergent disciplin-
ary understanding into biology. Sometimes a general approach, or a par tic-
u lar skill, will suffi  ce. Take, for instance, Metchnikoff . It was the Rus sian’s 
embryological preoccupations and Darwinian framework that informed his 
challenge, both methodological and theoretical, to the prevailing immuno-
logical theories of his time. These proved of little interest to microbiologists 
and immunochemists, who had no background in development to speak of 
and who  were focused on defi ning the mediators of immune response rather 
than looking at the etiology of the entire system. But Metchnikoff  had the 
vision to perceive the connection between one set of problems— evolutionary 
and developmental— and the mystery of identity as presented by immunity. 
As Fred Tauber argues, it may very well be the case that only an outsider, aloof 
from the immediate concerns of the dominant scientifi c community, could 
have posed the question of identity in the face of dynamic change so starkly.
Elaine Morgan, too, crossed a divide by bringing with her something of 
value. In her case, it was her pen. An En glish major at Oxford and a mother 
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of three, Morgan had spent a life writing screenplays and dramas for the BBC 
from a quiet base in Wales. But with an irascible wit and a fortunate turn of 
phrase, she was able to address that most basic of a readership’s faculties 
directly: its common sense. “Learn to trust the evidence of your own senses 
over that of the written word,” she wrote with just a pinch of disingenuous-
ness, knowing full well that the written word was her best weapon. Indeed, 
Morgan could aff ord to give a full and forceful treatment to a theory that had 
been proposed thirty years earlier by an insider, Alister Hardy, who, not yet 
having “Sir” affi  xed to his forename, had been wary to publish anything that 
might damage his nascent scientifi c career. When it came to advocating the 
“aquatic ape” theory, Morgan, by her own admission, had “nothing to lose, 
no high academic position to think of.” What she did have, however, was the 
skills of a dramaturge.
Coming from the outside in and of itself may allow for exercising greater 
imagination alongside, or even in some cases as an alternative to directly 
transporting par tic u lar tools, skills, or methods from home disciplines. 
Schrödinger’s precise combinatorial model, Sahotra Sarkar argues, and his 
truly revolutionary and insightful notion of a ge ne tic code, had less to do 
with his background as a physicist and more with an unrestrained inven-
tiveness. George Price, too, in translating game theory from economics and 
international aff airs to animal behavior,  wasn’t necessarily applying hard- 
won skills to a new setting, but rather exercising the kind of imaginative as-
sociative thinking which is so oft en stifl ed by internalist training and world-
view. To be sure, outsiders have oft en been lambasted for being unqualifi ed: 
such was Elaine Morgan’s fate, as well as that of Rashevsky’s, at least up to a 
certain point. But Samuel Butler, who had the distinction of being attacked 
by both T. H. Huxley and his grandson Julian, rather saw being an amateur 
as an advantage. (Huxley the grandson regarded Butler, alongside George 
Bernard Shaw, as “literary men,” whose views are “based not on scientifi c 
fact and method, but on wish- fulfi llment”). As Michael Ruse shows, Butler 
remained an outsider with respect to clubs and scientifi c societies and the 
like, but thought that being an amateur actually gave him a fresher perspec-
tive over the professionals (including and especially Darwin!).
A fresh perspective, then, may be the lot, or luck, of a diff erent kind of 
professional even when he thinks of himself, or is termed, an “amateur.” Prior 
training in a diff erent discipline or intellectual community may aff ord special 
access to associative or imaginative thinking and the ability to analogize. 
Specifi c methods and tools from home disciplines can serve as keys with 
which to enter from the outside and unlock par tic u lar questions. And the fact 
that the outsider may have little to lose may pose as an advantage, too.
You are reading copyrighted material published by University of Chicago Press. Unauthorized posting, copying, or distributing 
of this work except as permitted under U.S. copyright law is illegal and injures the author and publisher.
20 | oren harman & michael r. dietrich
But so can something even more prosaic. When François Jacob decided 
that he was going to try to apply the principles he had learned from studying 
bacteria and the viruses that attack them to the mouse and the diseases that 
attack it (and other mammals), he was following a considered personal phi-
losophy of science that regarded theories and models as nothing more than 
the recombination of elements present in previous theories and models. 
This to him was not only how “Nature the tinkerer” worked, but how science 
itself advances. And outsiders, he believed, are oft en in the best position to 
introduce new combinations. But, as Michel Morange aptly recognizes, this 
may very well be due simply to the fact that outsiders are much less con-
scious of obstacles, while being prone to “transgressions” because they are 
not at all familiar with the “rules of the game.” In Jacob’s case, there  were 
massive obstacles to climb in moving from the simplest of model organ-
isms to the most complex. Had these obstacles been known to him more 
precisely, they might have dissuaded him from trying. In the end, due to his 
work and others’, the mouse became the choice model organism for study-
ing mechanisms of disease in humans. In Schrödinger’s case there  were 
massive biochemical and molecular obstacles to scale as well, and much 
relevant biological knowledge remained unmastered. But as Francis Crick 
made clear, the main point of What Is Life?— that biology needs the stability 
of chemical bonds—“was one that only a physicist would feel it necessary to 
make.” And, of course, it made a diff erence. Lack of knowledge, or naiveté, 
may be as important to innovation as highly specifi c forms of know- how and 
sophistication.
The Platypus
Outsiders don’t always leave a mark, even when they try hard to do so. In 
this book David Hull is a stark example, a man as well placed as any on 
both sides of a disciplinary divide (in his case philosophy and systemat-
ics). Hull himself believed that a phi los o pher could “uncover, explicate and 
possibly solve problems in biological theory and methodology,” but, as 
T. J. Horder shows, he ended up contributing more to “studying the science 
of science scientifi cally”— a title of one of his papers— than to any debate 
within systematics. Indeed, Hull was very much aware that the majority of 
scientists invariably fi nd the work of phi los o phers, at least when it comes to 
their own fi eld, superfl uous. This is not to say that there is an unbreachable 
chasm between philosophy and the “hard core” of scientifi c practice, but 
that some disciplinary divides are harder to negotiate than others. Per-
suading biologists of the deep relevance of philosophy to their work contin-
ues to be a challenge.
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What is clear, however, is the extent to which modern biology has been 
constituted as a pastiche, a conglomeration of diff erent methods and tools 
and points of view and approaches. The term “ge ne tics” was coined by Wil-
liam Bateson in a private letter in 1905, but as a glance at Gregor Mendel’s story 
makes obvious, the modern theory of heredity had come into being as a 
blend between experimental physics, commercial plant breeding, botany, 
animal husbandry, local natural history, and even law. Microbiology, too, was 
later forged in a disciplinary furnace, to which chemistry, agriculture, medi-
cine, and economics all contributed. And molecular biology was constituted 
like a tassel of disparate strands, as researchers from diff erent fi elds led by 
par tic u lar problems found themselves obliged to master a host of tools and 
methods hitherto unlisted on the “how to” menu of the biologist.
Indeed, when Noam Chomsky challenged behaviorism, wielding the 
sword of generative linguistics, he was functioning as an outsider storming 
the gates, whereas when he championed animal behavior– infl uenced nativ-
ist biolinguistic theories, as W. Tecumseh Fitch shows, he was more like the 
insider importing “outsider” ideas. The overall result of these interventions 
was the refashioning of something called cognitive sciences that expanded 
the purview of biology. Whether or not “synthetic biology” will become a 
mainstay of the life sciences remains to be seen, but if Endy’s gradual refash-
ioning of the engineering vision from a revolutionary agenda into “nothing 
new  here” is an indication of anything, it is that “biology” as a discipline is an 
ever- changing quantity.
The point, as Heraclitus might have appreciated, is that what is construed 
as “in” and “out” is and always has been in constant fl ux. The biological 
traveler can never step twice into the same river; he will fi nd that not only 
have the waters changed— their color, temperature, and speed— but the 
banks, too, have changed, laying out a new topography. Indeed, the very 
organisms swimming about have morphed and been hunted and restocked 
from neighboring rivers. In biology— especially in biology—“outsiders” have 
been transformative.
In a very real sense, as Richard Lewontin stresses in the epilogue to this 
volume, the extreme dynamism of the life sciences problematizes the con-
cept of biology “outside the box.” Indeed, it problematizes the very notion 
of a “box.” An example comes from a 1997 paper from the Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences on re sis tance to phosphate insecticide in a 
sheep blowfl y. The paper— the fruit of a collaboration between botanists, zool-
ogists, and chemists— makes the point starkly:  here, the biological eff ect of 
re sis tance is unrobed step by step all the way down to a single atom eff ect, 
moving the analysis from biology to chemistry to physics. Does speaking 
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of an epistemic biological “box” help to understand how science is done in 
this case, Lewontin asks? Indeed, is this really an epistemic box at all? The 
answer, it seems, is to a great degree a refl ection of the history of modern 
biology: the gradual erasure, made possible both by methodological and 
theoretical advances, of the boundary between life and non- life, as well as 
the growing ability to look at systems as constituted by components, ame-
nable to mathematical and physical analysis. This is not merely, or simply, 
a story of reduction, but rather more accurately of accumulating more tools 
deemed relevant to the solution of mysteries provided by the natural world. 
As the tools multiply, so the epistemic “box” is enlarged to accommodate 
them. Yes, asking how a blowfl y has become resistant to phosphate insecti-
cide would be considered by most to fall under the purview of biology, but 
the way we attempt to answer such a question today as opposed to forty or 
sixty or one hundred years ago renders “biology” an ever- changing constant.
■
Looking at the “duck- bill mole” and other oddities of Australian wildlife, 
Governor John Hunter off ered in 1793 that “a promiscuous intercourse be-
tween the diff erent sexes of all these diff erent animals might account for 
their unlikely forms.”14 Indeed, so strange was the beast that the great Ger-
man comparative anatomist Johann Blumenbach christened it in 1800 Or-
nithorhynchus paradoxus. It would take time and careful scrutiny before the 
evolutionary lineage of the platypus was better understood, but even today, 
with all that we know, it remains a wondrous vision.
And so does biology, that most hodgepodge of all sciences. Still, as we hope 
readers will agree, the chimeric character of biology has oft en served it well. 
The cases in Outsider Scientists reveal how personal features such as per sis-
tence, institutional features such as the presence of willing patrons, mentors, 
and collaborators, and intellectual features such as the ability to create useful 
analogies and translations between fi elds fostered and promoted innovation 
in biology by newcomers as they constantly shaped and reshaped its form. 
The outsiders profi led in these pages, never content to merely “think diff er-
ently,” engaged themselves in the hard work of articulating connections be-
tween ideas, practices, people, and institutions that allowed their work to get 
a hearing among biologists and to gain a mea sure of infl uence. The success of 
these outsiders speaks not merely to their persuasiveness, but to their ability 
to understand key features of disparate fi elds and then build the bridges that 
connect and ultimately transform them.
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